

Computing Least Cores of Supermodular Cooperative Games (AAAI'17)

波多野大督(NII)

(Joint work with 吉田悠一 (NII & PFI))

河原林ERATO感謝祭シーズンIV

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An example of the cooperative game

- Given (V, ν)

- $V = \{ \text{blue smiley}, \text{orange smiley}, \text{green smiley} \}$

- $\nu(\text{blue smiley}) = 15$

- $\nu(\text{orange smiley}) = 25$

- $\nu(\text{green smiley}) = 30$

- $\nu(\text{blue smiley}, \text{orange smiley}) = 30$

- $\nu(\text{orange smiley}, \text{green smiley}) = 50$

- $\nu(\text{blue smiley}, \text{green smiley}) = 50$ ← violate

- $\nu(\text{blue smiley}, \text{orange smiley}, \text{green smiley}) = 80$

$$\nu(\text{blue smiley}, \text{orange smiley}, \text{green smiley}) = 80$$



Find a value division

- $x(\text{blue smiley}) = 15$

- $x(\text{orange smiley}) = 35$

- $x(\text{green smiley}) = 30$



$$x(\text{blue smiley}) + x(\text{green smiley}) \leq \nu(\text{blue smiley}, \text{green smiley})$$

leave from the cooperation

An example of the cooperative game

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- $\nu(\text{blue smiley}, \text{green smiley}) = 50$

- $\nu(\text{blue smiley}, \text{orange smiley}, \text{green smiley}) = 80$

No violation!

$$\nu(\text{blue smiley}, \text{orange smiley}, \text{green smiley}) = 80$$



Find a value division

- $x(\text{blue smiley}) = 15$

- $x(\text{orange smiley}) = 30$

- $x(\text{green smiley}) = 35$



No one leaves

A goal of the cooperative game

Finding a **core** can be described as the following program

$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{find} & \mathbf{x} \\ \text{s.t.} & \mathbf{x}(S) \geq \nu(S) \quad \forall \emptyset \subsetneq S \subsetneq V \\ & \mathbf{x}(V) = \nu(V) \\ & \mathbf{x}(v) \geq 0 \quad \forall v \in V. \end{array}$$

- A value division $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}_+^V$ if $\mathbf{x}(V) = \nu(V)$
- A value division is in the core if $\mathbf{x}(S) \geq \nu(S)$ for all $S \subseteq V$

Finding a core of a cooperative game is **NP-complete**

 **Supermodular** cooperative game

Supermodular cooperative game

- **Supermodular cooperative game** is a cooperative game where a characteristic function v is *supermodular*

A function $f : 2^V \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is called supermodular if
$$f(S) + f(T) \leq f(S \cap T) + f(S \cup T)$$
for all $S, T \subseteq V$, and $S \subseteq T$


- Applications
 - **Induced subgraph game** [Deng and Papadimitriou 1994]
 - **Airport game** [Littlechild and Owen 1973]
 - **Bidder collusion game** [Graham, Marshall and Richard 1990]
 - **Multicast tree game** [Feigenbaum, Papadimitriou and Shenker 2001]
 - **Bankruptcy game** [O'Neill 1982]

An application of the supermodular cooperative game

Induced subgraph game

- Weighted hypergraph: $G = (V, E, w)$
- Characteristic function $\nu : 2^V \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$ is the total weight of hyperedges $e \in E$ such that every vertex in S belongs to e

Example:



$$\nu(v_1) = \nu(v_2) = \nu(v_3) = 0,$$


$$\nu(v_1, v_2) = 0, \quad \nu(v_2, v_3) = 1, \quad \nu(v_1, v_3) = 0,$$

$$\nu(v_1, v_2, v_3) = 2.$$

An example of induced subgraph game

In a certain K-project...

- Professor K gives bonuses depending on the number of accepted top conference-papers
- Want to find a bonus division in the core



$$\nu(v_1) = \nu(v_2) = \nu(v_3) = 0,$$

$$\nu(v_1, v_2) = 0, \nu(v_2, v_3) = 1, \nu(v_1, v_3) = 0,$$

$$\nu(v_1, v_2, v_3) = 2.$$

※この例はフィクションであり、実在する人物、団体等とは一切関係ありません

Motivation

- Property of supermodular cooperative game
 - A value division called Shapley value is **always** in the core
- Focus on more general solution concepts than the core
 - Want to find the *stablest* value division
 - **Strong least core** $x(S) - \nu(S) \geq \epsilon \quad \forall \emptyset \subsetneq S \subsetneq V$
 - **Weak least core** $x(S) - \nu(S) \geq \epsilon|S| \quad \forall \emptyset \subsetneq S \subsetneq V$

Goal of our work

- Goal is to find **the strong and weak least core values** of supermodular cooperative game
- The strong and weak least core values is obtained by solving the following LP

$$\begin{array}{ll} \min & -\epsilon \\ \text{s.t.} & \mathbf{x}(S) \geq \nu(S) + \epsilon \quad \forall \emptyset \subsetneq S \subsetneq V \\ & \mathbf{x}(V) = \nu(V) \\ & \mathbf{x}(v) \geq 0 \quad \forall v \in V, \end{array}$$

where ν is supermodular

No computational analysis about the strong and weak least core values of supermodular cooperative game exists

Idea of our approach (1)

- Instead of solving the optimization problem, fix $\epsilon > 0$ and consider its feasibility
- Define a function $f_\epsilon : 2^V \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ as

$$f_\epsilon(S) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } S = \emptyset, \\ -\nu(S) - \epsilon & \text{if } \emptyset \subsetneq S \subsetneq V, \\ -\nu(V) & \text{if } S = V. \end{cases}$$

(V, ν) is a supermodular game

- Solve the following feasibility problem

$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{find} & \mathbf{x} \\ \text{s.t.} & \mathbf{x}(S) \leq f_\epsilon(S) \quad \forall \emptyset \subsetneq S \subsetneq V \\ & \mathbf{x}(V) = f_\epsilon(V) \\ & \mathbf{x}(v) \leq 0 \quad \forall v \in V. \end{array}$$

Idea of our approach (2)

- To check the feasibility...

$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{find} & \mathbf{x} \\ \text{s.t.} & \mathbf{x}(S) \leq f_\epsilon(S) \quad \forall \emptyset \subsetneq S \subsetneq V \\ & \mathbf{x}(V) = f_\epsilon(V) \\ & \mathbf{x}(v) \leq 0 \quad \forall v \in V. \end{array}$$

- Define $p_\epsilon = \max\{\mathbf{x}(V) \mid \mathbf{x} \in P(f_\epsilon)\}$, where $P(f) = \{\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}^V \mid \mathbf{x}(S) \leq f(S) \text{ for all } \emptyset \subsetneq S \subsetneq V\}$
- The above program is feasible iff $p_\epsilon \geq f_\epsilon(V)$
 - p_ϵ can be computed in polynomial time (Frank and Tardos 1988; Naitoh and Fujishige 1992)

Idea of our approach (3)

$S, T \subseteq V$ are **crossing** if $S \cap T \neq \emptyset$, $S \setminus T \neq \emptyset$, $T \setminus S \neq \emptyset$, and $S \cup T \neq V$. A function $f : 2^V \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is called **crossing submodular** if

$$f(S) + f(T) \geq f(S \cap T) + f(S \cup T)$$

holds for any crossing $S, T \subseteq V$.



$$f_\epsilon(S) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } S = \emptyset, \\ -\nu(S) - \epsilon & \text{if } \emptyset \subsetneq S \subsetneq V, \\ -\nu(V) & \text{if } S = V. \end{cases} \text{ is crossing submodular}$$

Idea of our approach (4)

To compute p_{ϵ} ...


Theorem 1 (Fugishige 1984) *Let $f : 2^V \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ be a crossing submodular function and let $p = \max\{\mathbf{x}(V) \mid \mathbf{x} \in P(f)\}$. Let $q, r \in \mathbb{R}$ be defined as*

$$q = \min_{\mathcal{S} \in \mathcal{P}_2(V)} \sum_{S \in \mathcal{S}} f(S),$$
$$r = \min_{\mathcal{S} \in \bar{\mathcal{P}}_3(V)} \frac{1}{|\mathcal{S}| - 1} \sum_{S \in \mathcal{S}} f(S).$$

Then, we have $p = \min\{q, r\}$.

By the theorem, characterize the strong and weak least core values of the supermodular cooperative game

Induced subgraph game



- The strong least core value

$$\epsilon^* = - \min_{\mathcal{S} \in \mathcal{P}_2} \frac{c(\mathcal{S})}{|\mathcal{S}|}$$

How well the hypergraph is clustered by the partition \mathcal{S}

\mathcal{P}_2 : the family of all partitions \mathcal{S} of V at least 2 sets
 $c(\mathcal{S})$: cut weight of a partition \mathcal{S} of V

- A value division in the strong least core
 - Use the **ellipsoid method** to find the value division

Conclusion

- Goal:
To find the **strong least core** and the **weak least core** of the **supermodular cooperative game**
- Contributions:
 - Provide theoretical characterizations of the strong and the weak least core values
 - Derive explicit concise formulations of the **induced subgraph game** and the **airport game**